In two recent papers, 1 one a critique of two papers of mine, 2 William Lane Craig has sought to put the Free Will Defence in the service of the traditional doctrine of hell; he has sought to establish, in other words, that the following proposition, which I shall call the Damnation Thesis (DT), is at least possibly true:
can demonstrate that p entails (DT) and hence that step (1) of the argument is sound, then p will likely be no less controversial than (DT); and if p is just as controversial as (DT), then step (2) of the argument will likely be no easier to establish than the conclusion. In any event, Craig's challenge is to find a substitution instance for p that will enable him to build a plausible defence of both premises; and in what follows, I shall argue that he has so far failed to meet the challenge.
I shall divide what follows into four sections. In section i, I shall make some preliminary remarks, comparing two tasks: that of arguing, as Craig does, that some controversial metaphysical proposition is logically possible with that of arguing, as I do, that some such proposition is logically impossible. Then, in sections ii, iii, and iv, I shall examine in turn three different propositions that Craig claims to be logically possible. With respect to each of these propositions, I shall defend one of two claims: Either the proposition does not entail (DT) and therefore cannot be used to establish the possibility of (DT), or we have good reasons to deny that the proposition is itself possible in the broadly logical sense. i Ever since Alvin Plantinga published his monumental (and transforming) work on the Free Will Defence, both Plantinga and his many disciples have tended to assign a privileged position to the assumption that certain very intricate propositions are possible in the broadly logical sense.
In an effort to prove that God's existence is consistent with the quantity and variety of evil in the world, for example, Plantinga assumes that the following is at least possible:
(41) All the evil in Kronos is broadly moral evil, and it was not within the power of God to create a world containing a better balance of broadly moral good and evil.
variety, then the world indexed proposition: All the evil in Kronos is broadly moral evil, is itself necessarily false; and if that proposition is necessarily false, so also is (41). At the very least, therefore, a nontheist could justifiably register the following complaint: If Plantinga's opponents, such as J. L. Mackie, nowhere successfully demonstrate an inconsistency in theism,
neither does Plantinga successfully demonstrate the possibility of (41). Of course, (41) clearly is possible in this epistemic sense: For all we know, (41) is true. But for all we know, (41) may be logically impossible as well.
Or consider the most fundamental assumption of the Free Will Defence: the assumption that libertarian free will is at least logically possible. To demonstrate that assumption, one would have to refute the view, held by such rationalists as Leibniz and Spinoza, that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in its strongest form) is not only true, but necessarily true. But so far as I know, Plantinga has never even tried to do that and has never even tried, therefore, to establish the most fundamental assumption upon which his Free Will Defence rests. And that is hardly surprising. If we cannot settle the question of whether a proposition is possible (in the broadly logical sense) simply by inspecting the proposition and discovering that it is free from any obvious contradiction, then questions about possibility are sometimes exceedingly difficult and, as a practical matter, impossible to answer in a definitive way. As an illustration, we need only remind ourselves of the Anselmian assumption that God's existence is possible; even if that assumption is true, as I believe it is, one wonders what would count as a proof that it is true.
Accordingly, when Craig writes: 'Talbott has set himself the heavy task of proving that the Molinist position [or at least (DT)] is not even broadly logically possible', 4 he needs to bear in mind two points: First, though I have indeed set for myself the task of arguing that (DT) is logically impossible, and though I believe my arguments are strong as well as sound, I have never claimed that they amount to a proof in some narrow sense of 'proof'; I have made no attempt, for example, to restrict myself to premises that most reasonable people, or even most reasonable philosophers, would likely accept. And second, the task that Craig has set for himself-that of proving that (DT) is possible-is no less 'heavy' than the one I have set for myself. One could, of course, criticize a specific argument to the effect that (DT) is logically impossible without committing oneself to the modal status of (DT) at all, but that does not seem to be Craig's strategy. Instead, he tries to counter my argument that (DT) is logically impossible by setting forth his own argument that (DT) is logically possible. And in the case of controversial metaphysical propositions, proofs of possibility are, as a class, no less difficult than proofs of impossibility.
In an effort to demonstrate that (DT) is possible, moreover, Craig sets before the reader a bewildering number of unsupported assertions to the effect that this or that is logically possible.
Here are but a few examples from one of his articles:
. . . it is possible that some persons out of self-will or perversity would freely reject God no matter what circumstances He placed them in.
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. . . it is possible that in every world realizable by God in which persons are free with respect to salvation, some persons irrevocably reject God.
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. . . It is possible that the very experience itself of being in the immediate presence of Christ (cf. the beatific vision) will simply drive from the minds of his redeemed any awareness of the lost in hell.
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. . . it is possible that the reality of lost persons is a fact the pain of which He alone shall endure for eternity.
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Because each of these items, which Craig believes to be logically possible, I believe to be logically impossible, I for one would like something more than the bare assertion that they are indeed possible. Take the last item as an example. Quite apart from other difficulties, which I shall explore below, one wonders why Craig thinks it even possible that God would willingly (a) There exists at least one creaturely essence E such that, for any circumstances C in which the instantiation of E would be free in the matter of being reconciled to God, the instantiation of E would in fact freely refuse to be reconciled to God in C.
And let us ask this question: Are there good reasons to believe, as Craig does, that (a) is possible in the broadly logical sense?
Before we can answer this question, we must first achieve a clearer understanding of what it might mean for someone freely to refuse to be reconciled to God. Just what kind of choice does Craig have in mind here? Religious people sometimes speak of God as if he were just another human magistrate who seeks his own glory and requires obedience for its own sake; they speak as if we might reject the Creator and Father of our souls without rejecting ourselves, op-pose his will for our lives without opposing, schizophrenically perhaps, our own will for our lives. Craig thus speaks of 'the stubborn refusal to submit one's will to that of another'. 13 But suppose now that the following were necessarily true, as I believe it is: God wills for me exactly what, at the most fundamental level, I want for myself; he wills that I should experience supreme happiness, that my deepest yearnings should be satisfied, and that all of my needs should be met.
How then might we understand human disobedience and opposition to God?
As a first step towards answering this question, let us distinguish between two senses in which a person might reject God. If a person S refuses to be reconciled to God and S's refusal does not rest upon ignorance, or misinformation, or deception of any kind, then let us say that S has made a fully informed decision to reject God; but if S refuses to be reconciled to God and S's refusal does rest upon ignorance or deception of some kind, then let us say that S has made a less that fully informed decision to reject God. Now no one, I take it, would deny the possibility of someone's making a less than fully informed decision to reject God; it happens all the time.
Even the Apostle Paul, before his conversion to Christianity, presumably saw himself as rejecting the Christian God at one time. But what might qualify as a motive for someone's making a fully informed decision to reject God? Not only does nothing seem to qualify as a relevant motive; if God is the ultimate source of human happiness, as Christians have traditionally believed, then anyone in a position to make a fully informed decision would also seem to have the strongest conceivable motive not to reject God. As a counter to this, Craig quotes the famous passage in Book I of Paradise Lost, where Milton's Satan declares that he would rather rule in hell than serve in heaven. But that hardly illustrates a fully informed decision to reject God. Even if Milton's Satan were a believable character-which, in my opinion, he isn't 14 -we have no reason to believe that such a character, with so many illusions yet to be shattered, could hold out for an eternity against the love of God. Observe the many ways in which Satan comforts himself: with the illusion that he 'Can make a heaven of Hell', with the illusion that in hell he is at least free (despite his bondage to destructive desires), and with the illusion that in hell he 'may reign secure'. He evidently never even considers the outer darkness (where he would have no one to rule and no world to experience); nor has he yet come to terms with the fact that his willful opposition to God, his desire for revenge, is in reality an attack upon himself. It is a tribute to Milton's art, however, that by Book IV Satan has already lost most of the illusions that made the 'heroic' speech of Book I possible; and had Milton's art not been the slave of his theology, I have no doubt that the more pitiful (and even human) character of Book IV would have repented.
Now if, as I have suggested, a fully informed person would have the strongest conceivable motive to become reconciled to God and no conceivable motive to reject him, then a fully informed decision to reject God would have to be irrational in a very strong sense. And though
Craig seems to concede this, he goes on to ask: 'Is it not possible that the will to self-autonomy be so strong in some persons that they will act irrationally in preferring self-rule to God's rule?'
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Is it not possible, he in effect asks, that some persons will irrationally prefer self-rule even after discovering that it is an impossible illusion, the worst sort of bondage? He goes on to ask: 'Indeed, does there need to be any motivation for such rebellion at all?' 16 Perhaps not. But at this point, Craig ignores an obvious question: How could such irrational rebellion possibly qualify as a free decision to reject God? We might imagine that, even as an alcoholic finds it psychologically impossible to refuse another drink (and thus impossible to follow his or her own best judgement in the matter), so a fully informed sinner might find it impossible to act upon his or her own motives. Or we might imagine that a fully informed person makes a decision which is simply inexplicable; like a freak of nature or a purely random event, it can be explained neither by antecedent causes nor by any discernable purpose or reason for acting. In neither case, however, would such a decision qualify as a free decision. Proponents of the Free Will Defence, being incompatibilists, inevitably insist that an action is free only if it is not causally determined by factors outside the agent's control, and they sometimes proceed as if there were no other necessary conditions of a free action. But there surely are other necessary conditions, and one of them is this: Only a rational agent-that is, only someone who meets certain minimal standards of rationality-can act freely. If, without any motive for doing so, S consistently acts contrary to S's own interest as well as contrary to the interest of all others, then S is not a rational agent and is not capable, therefore, of performing free actions.
I see no reason to suppose it even possible, therefore, that some persons would make a fully informed but free decision to reject God. But that still might not satisfy Craig, and he still might want to raise an objection of the following kind: Even if a fully informed but free decision to reject God is logically impossible, the perversity of some persons may be such that God cannot actualize a world in which these persons freely accept God either. For perhaps no decision of the relevant kind-whether it be to reject God or to accept him-can be both free and fully informed. That seems to be what Craig has in mind when he writes: 'It may well be the case that for some people the degree of revelation that would have to be imparted to them in order to secure their salvation would have to be so stunning that their freedom to disobey would be effectively removed…'. 17 Now my own view, for what it is worth, is that the very idea of a freedomremoving revelation rests upon a mistake, as does the idea that we are free only for as long as But do not remarks such as these threaten to undermine the Free Will Defence, as a reply to the argument from evil? I see no reason why they should. The process whereby God first creates rational agents and then reveals himself to them is far more complex, I believe, than we are apt to imagine; and it is to that complexity that proponents of the Free Will Defence ought to appeal in explaining the kinds of evils which, unlike everlasting separation, are compatible with the existence of God. It seems to me utterly doubtful, for example, that even an omnipotent being could create conscious rational agents ex nihilo and simply constitute them with perfect understanding and absolute clarity of vision. If, as I have elsewhere remarked, 'a degree of ambiguity, separation, and blindness is an essential element in the process by which God creates a free, independent, and rational agent', 19 then we have plenty of room left, particularly in the early stages of creation, for indeterminism and free choices made in relative stages of ignorance. According to the Christian faith, however, the creation of rational agents (and then of sons and daughters of God) is also a process whereby God overcomes ambiguity, separation, and blindness and thereby prepares the way for stunning revelations; it is even one in which he uses the consequences of separation and blindness in our lives as a means of revelation. And unless we adopt an utterly contrived and artificial conception of human freedom, our transformation into sons and daughters of God is not a process whereby God gradually restricts and then eliminates altogether our freedom of will.
So perhaps the sum of the matter is this: Given certain (rather artificial) stipulations about the nature of free will, we can concede, at least for the sake of argument, that (a) is possibly true.
But it hardly follows that (DT) is likewise possibly true; for (a) does not entail (DT), and it re-
mains open to God not to instantiate creaturely essences of the kind described in (a). And in addition to that rather obvious point, there is also this more subtle point: We can concede even the possibility that God has a morally sufficient reason to instantiate creaturely essences of the kind described in (a)--essences that suffer from transworld reprobation--and still deny that (DT) is logically possible. For we have no reason to believe it even possible that God would withhold a revelation of truth from some persons, or keep them in perpetual bondage to ignorance and illusion, merely to maintain forever the artificial kind of free agency that Craig imagines. But so what? We must also take into account, at this point, how a loving God would respond in the event that he should encounter such a possibility as a tragic reality. If every creaturely essence suffered from transworld reprobation and God (who has middle knowledge on Craig's conception) knew this, then either he would refuse to instantiate any essences at all or, if he did instantiate some of them, he would have a morally sufficient reason not to leave created persons entirely free with respect to salvation; that is, he would have a morally sufficient reason not to leave them free in the relevant (but artificial) sense that requires bondage to ignorance and illusion.
Craig also insists, however, upon a more subtle point, namely this: Whether or not some creaturely essences suffer from transworld reprobation, it is possible, Craig thinks, that God can actualize a world in which some persons are freely reconciled to him only if he also actualizes one in which some persons irrevocably reject him; it is even possible, Craig insists, that God can increase the number of the saved by permitting a specific number of others to be damned.
where a possible world is feasible for God if, and only if, it is within God's power to make it actual, Craig in effect claims that the following is possible in the broadly logical sense:
(b) There are feasible worlds in which some persons are freely reconciled to God; but for any feasible world w, if in w some persons are freely reconciled to God, then in w some persons irrevocably reject God.
Now it is one thing to concede the possibility that every creaturely essence suffers from transworld reprobation; it is another altogether to concede that a proposition such as (b) is possi- (VGT) Necessarily, God would have created persons whom he knew would sin only if he also knew that he could achieve a complete victory over their sin. (GFT) Necessarily, for any collection C of persons who do not suffer from transworld reprobation, there is a feasible world in which every member of C is freely reconciled to God.
But (VGT) is true only if (b) is necessarily false. For if (VGT) is true and

Is (GFT) true? I believe it is, and my argument is essentially this: For any two persons, S and S',
if there is a feasible set of circumstances in which S is freely reconciled to God and there is a feasible set of circumstances in which S' is freely reconciled to God, then there is also a feasible set of circumstances in which S and S' are both freely reconciled to God.
Now Craig evidently believes that this argument is fallacious. He thus writes:
even if it is possible that for every created person S there is a set of circumstances C in which S affirmatively responds to God's grace and is saved, it does not follow that there is a compossible set of circumstances in which all persons are saved. It may be a tragic fact of the matter, for example, that Joe, Jr. will freely respond to God's grace and be saved only if his father Joe, Sr. failed to do so.
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But I find these remarks confusing. On the assumption that transworld reprobation is possible, Craig surely is right about this: From the mere possibility that, for every created person S, there is a feasible set of circumstances in which S would freely do A, we cannot infer even that in fact, for every S, there is a feasible set of circumstances in which S would freely do A; much less can we infer that the various sets of circumstances are compossible. And Craig would also have been right if he had said this: Even if there is a set of circumstances C 1 in which Joe, Jr. would freely submit his will to God and there is a set of circumstances C 2 in which Joe, Sr. would freely submit his will to God, we cannot infer that C 1 and C 2 are compossible sets of circumstances.
But neither observation has any relevance to the argument I have given, which rests instead upon inferences such as the following: If there is a feasible set of circumstances C 1 in which Joe, Jr.
would freely submit his will to God and there is a feasible set of circumstances C 2 in which Joe, Sr. would freely submit his will to God, then there is also a feasible set of circumstances (either (C 1 & C 2 ) or some other set of circumstances) in which Joe, Jr. and Joe, Sr. would both freely submit their wills to God.
In support of this inference, I would offer the following consideration. If in C 1 Joe, Jr.
would freely submit his will to God, then in C 1 Joe, Jr. would encounter a set of appearances A 1 such that, if God were to provide Joe, Jr. with just these appearances, then Joe, Jr. would freely submit his will to God; and similarly, if in C 2 Joe, Sr. would freely submit his will to God, then in C 2 Joe, Sr. would encounter a set of appearances A 2 such that, if God were to provide Joe, Sr. with just these appearances, then Joe, Sr. would freely submit his will to God as well. Now presumably, the way things appear to Joe, Jr. need not cohere or even be consistent with the way things appear to Joe, Sr., and God can always vary how things appear to Joe, Jr. What the argument I have given trades upon is the fact that God is in a unique position to work with each of us one on one. If, upon contemplating our essences, God should determine that it would be to our eternal advantage to live in a common universe such as you and I believe we live in, God could always place us in such a universe; but if he should determine that it would be more to our advantage if he should systematically deceive us (for a season and for our own good), he could do that as well. If necessary, he could even provide us with misleading appearances concerning the existence or the fate of other persons. If a Jonathan Edwards, for example,
would not freely repent of his sin unless he were to believe that millions of people are writhing in everlasting flames, God could always provide the relevant illusion (perhaps beginning at the time of Edwards' death) until such time as the new Edwards is spiritually mature enough to appreciate the truth of the matter. Indeed, for all we know, there are spiritual realms which have no ordinary physical connection with our universe; and though I think it highly unlikely that it would be necessary, some of these could be specially tailored for those whose cure requires a period of systematic deception.
In general, God's options in dealing with created persons over an infinite stretch of time go far beyond anything we can imagine. I have no doubt that, in the early stages of creation in particular, God must work around a lot of obstacles; that is, he must work around the free choices of created persons. If some creaturely essences suffer from transworld reprobation, for example, then God cannot instantiate these essences, leave them free (in a sense that requires ignorance and illusion), and bring it about that the instantiations are freely reconciled to God. But for any person S who does not suffer from transworld reprobation, God can think in terms of a billion lifetimes, a billion different realms and universes and sets of appearances, a billion ways (including a billion different forms of deception) to prevent the choices that other persons make from having the wrong kind of influence upon a given choice that S makes. Given all of these options available to God, (GFT) seems highly plausible; it also seems quite impossible that God could increase the number of the redeemed by instantiating creaturely essences that suffer from transworld reprobation. I conclude, therefore, that (b) is necessarily false. God could produce such happiness in some created persons without also producing it in all others.
Now in response to this, Craig contends that God could permit some persons to damn themselves forever and still safeguard the blessedness of those in heaven. He makes two suggestions: first, that God could obliterate from the minds of the redeemed 'any knowledge of lost persons so that they experience no pangs of remorse for them'; 22 and second, that the glory of It is possible that the very experience itself of being in the presence of Christ (cf. the beatific vision) will simply drive from the minds of His redeemed any awareness of the lost in hell. . . . In such a case, the redeemed would still have such knowledge, but they would never be conscious of it and so never pained by it. 23 Craig thus concludes that the following is at least logically possible:
(c) God will permit some persons to damn themselves freely, and he alone will endure the pain of knowing that these persons are eternally miserable and lost forever.
Now (c) clearly does entail (DT); so if (c) is possible, so also is (DT). But my previous arguments against the possibility of (DT) seem to apply with equal force against the possibility of (c), and neither of Craig's suggestions effectively counters those arguments. Consider his first suggestion more closely. As Craig sees it, the truth about the universe is ultimately tragic; so according to his first suggestion, God conceals the truth from the redeemed, even as a parent might conceal a painful truth from a child. In effect God performs a kind of lobotomy on the redeemed; he simply 'obliterates from their minds any knowledge of those persons who come to be lost. In the case of those whose entire family is lost, this would mean, I presume, that God expunges from their minds every memory of parents and other family members; and I doubt that
Craig has any conception of how much of a person's mind that would destroy. He is right, of course, about this:
We can all think of cases in which we shield persons from knowledge which would be painful for them and which they do not need to have, and, far from doing something immoral, we are, in so sparing them, exemplifying the virtue of mercy.
But withholding information is one thing; obliterating part of a mind something else altogether.
And in any event, Craig's observation has no obvious relevance to the argument I have given.
Would he deny that the happiness of those from whom we appropriately withhold painful information would be more worthwhile if it did not require such deception? Consider the conditions under which it is appropriate to withhold painful information from a loved one. In every case, I
would suggest, this is either a concession to someone's poor physical health-as when a doctor conceals from a woman, critically injured in a traffic accident, that her child was killed-or a concession to someone's psychological or spiritual immaturity. The blissful ignorance that results from such deception is not only not supremely worthwhile; it is even inferior to the experience of misery under certain conditions. For no one who truly loves another would want to remain blissfully ignorant of the other's fate, however painful the knowledge of such a fate might be. No loving father, for example-not even one whose daughter endures a brutal rape and murder and not even one whose son commits suicide-would want to remain blissfully ignorant about what happened. It is far better, he would judge, to know the truth of the matter; he might even take elaborate steps to discover the truth. And the idea that he might prefer to have all memory of a son or a daughter obliterated from his mind-that he might prefer this over his anguish-is simply preposterous.
We must also consider, at this point, the kind of deception that an omnipotent and perfectly loving God might willingly employ in an effort to bring reconciliation to a fallen world.
We observed in the previous section that God could, if he so chose, deceive one person concerning the ultimate fate of others, and we now find that Craig countenances just such a deception.
But with this difference: According to Craig's first suggestion, God foists upon his 'redeemed'
an eternal deception. And that, I must insist, is logically impossible. I have no doubt that, in order to meet the needs of his loved ones, God sometimes employs a temporary deception as a means of redemption; as the Apostle Paul himself teaches, God sometimes deceives those who are unready for the truth and does so as a means of bringing them ultimately to the truth. 24 But here the goal is to prepare people for an ultimate unveiling of truth; as Jesus said, we shall know the truth, and the truth (not an elaborate deception) shall set us free.
moreover, only if the truth about the universe is ultimately glorious rather than tragic. For if it were tragic, then God would face the following choice: Either (i) he could reveal to us the true dimensions of the tragedy, in which case we might still find some consolation in sharing our eternal grief with others, or (ii) he could conceal the tragedy from us, in which case we might remain blissfully ignorant. Given the necessity of such a choice, the first option strikes me as far superior to the second, but neither option is compatible with the most worthwhile kind of happiness. In the first case, we would be far happier if we could believe that our lost loved ones would eventually be restored to us; in the second, the very fact that our happiness requires a deception proves that it would be more worthwhile if it did not require a deception and was not, in that sense, a sham.
So far as I can tell, therefore, Craig offers nothing of substance in support of his suggestion that a loving God might foist an elaborate deception on his redeemed. But what about Craig's second suggestion? Is it possible that the beatific vision would remove all knowledge of the lost from the consciousness of the redeemed? In order better to assess this matter, let us distinguish between two kinds of ecstatic experiences: those which fill the recipient with love for others and those which do not. The latter might include the kind of ecstacy, such as some drug addicts seem to crave, that fixes one's attention upon oneself and upon the quality of one's own experience, to the exclusion of all else; the former might include the kind of experience that my own mother had when she almost died after giving birth to my twin sisters. As she later described the experience, which she interpreted as an encounter with God, it included an overwhelming sense of well being and of the groundlessness of her fear. Having overheard medical personnel speak matterof-factly about her imminent death, she feared greatly that her death would have disastrous consequences for her children; and the best part of her experience, as she saw it, was the sense of assurance that all would be well for her children, regardless of what might happen to her. Now it is simply not possible that such a mystical encounter with God should both have enhanced my mother's love for her children and have removed the knowledge of her children from her consciousness. If God could somehow have diminished her love for her children, perhaps then he could have removed the knowledge of them from her consciousness without obliterating that knowledge altogether; but in that case he would also have removed a necessary condition of supremely worthwhile happiness, as I have defined it. Accordingly, the argument against Craig's second suggestion is essentially the same as the one I have already given against Hard Hearted
Theism. It is possible that the beatific vision will drive all knowledge of the lost from the consciousness of the redeemed (without obliterating it altogether) only if it is possible that the beatific vision will make the redeemed less loving and thus more calloused. But it is not possible that the beatific vision should undermine supremely worthwhile happiness, and neither, therefore, is it possible that such a vision should make someone less loving or more calloused. It is not possible, therefore, that the beatific vision will drive all knowledge of the lost from the consciousness of the redeemed. 
